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Recent Developments
CHERNOBYL

FALLOUT:

TRANSBOUNDARY

RECENT

IAEA

CONVENTIONS

EXPAND

NUCLEAR POLLUTION LAW

The Chernobyl accident demonstrates vividly that nuclear safety is
truly a global issue... In a very real sense we are all hostages to
each other's performance.1
After releasing a radioactive cloud over Europe, the April
1986 nuclear power plant accident at Chernobyl in the USSR 2

sparked

a

chain-reaction

of

diplomatic

negotiation

that

culminated in two recent International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) conventions on nuclear accidents.3 The Convention on
Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (Convention on Early
1 Chernobyl Causing Big Revisions in Global Nuclear Power Policies, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27,
1986, at 1, col. 1 (statement ofJames K. Asselstine, Member of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission).
2 See generally Serrill, Anatomy of a Catastrophe, TIME, Sept. 1, 1986, at 26; Fischer,
The International Response: Chernobyl, The Emerging Story, BULL. ATOM. Sci., Aug./Sept.
1986, at 46; Nuclear Plant Safety-Response to Chernobyl, IAEA BULL., Autumn 1986, at
5-39.
3 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, openedfor signature Sept.
26, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1370 (1986), reprintedin IAEA BULL., Winter 1986, at 52 [hereinafter
Convention on Early Notification], and Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, openedfor signature Sept. 26, 1986, 25 I.L.M.
1377 (1986), reprinted in IAEA BULL., Winter 1986, at 55 [hereinafter Convention on
Assistance]. See also Phuong, Experts Adopt Nuclear Safety Agreements, IAEA BULL., Autumn
1986, at 63-64 (summarizing the conventions); Messagefrom the Presidentof the United States
Transmitting Two Conventions, S. TREATY Doc. No. 4, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., at v-xi (Letter of submittal by Secretary of State George P. Schultz to the President, Mar. 10, 1987)
(summarizing the Conventions from a U.S. perspective) [hereinafter Message]; Highlights-Special and Regular Sessions of the IAEA 30th General Conference, IAEA BULL., Winter
1986, at 44 [hereinafter Highlights].
Because three nations "definitively" signed the Convention on Early Notification on
Sept. 26, 1986, it automatically entered into force on Oct. 27, 1986 pursuant to art. 12,
paras. (2), (3). The Convention on Assistance entered into force on Feb. 26, 1987. See
Message, supra, at vi. The Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate
began consideration of the conventions on March 23, 1987. See 133 CONG. REC. S3690
(daily ed. Mar. 23, 1986)(Treaty Doc. No. 100-4).
The IAEA Bulletin publishes in each issue the following statement defining the
Agency:
The International Atomic Energy Agency, which came into being on July 29,
1957, is an independent intergovernmental organization within the United Nations system. Headquartered in Vienna, Austria, the Agency currently has 113
Member States who together work to carry out the main objectives of IAEA's
Statute: To accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace,
health, and prosperity throughout the world and to ensure so far as it is able
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Notification) and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a
Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (Convention on
Assistance) were both opened for signature on September 26,
1986 at the end of a three-day IAEA special session on the lessons of the Soviet nuclear plant disaster.4 In the months following adoption, sixty IAEA member-states signed the Convention
on Early Notification
and fifty-nine members signed the Conven5
tion on Assistance.
These conventions structure international expectations for
quick response to the transnational effects of nuclear accidents.6
In doing so, the conventions aim to reduce the confusion immediately following such accidents by: (1) allowing more rational
and effective crisis management responsive to accident-specific
information; and (2) coordinating specialized national and international assistance capabilities. Although only committing signatory countries to do "what most would consider obvious and
natural,"' 7 the conventions nevertheless expand international
legal responsibility for the extraterritorial consequences of nuclear pollution.
I.

TRANSBOUNDARY

RADIOLOGICAL POLLUTION UNDER

INTERNATIONAL LAW

The principle of territorial sovereignty is the analytical starting point for assessing state responsibility for extraterritorial environmental effects of activities conducted on national territory."
The doctrine has two potentially conflicting sides: first, a state is
sovereign within its boundaries, and should therefore be permitthat assistance provided by it, or at its request or under its supervision or control, is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.
IAEA BULL., Winter 1986, at 3.

4 See Final Document of the Special Session of the General Conference, Sept. 26,
1986, IAEA Doc. GC(SPL.I)/RES/I, reprinted in Highlights, supra note 3, at 44; Atomic
Power Safety Steps Approved, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1986, at 36, col. 1 [hereinafter Safety

Steps].
5 Message, supra note 3, at vi (number of signatories as of Feb. 15, 1987); see also
Szasz, Table on the Status of the Conventions, 25 I.L.M. 1391 (1986) (showing status as of
October 29, 1986).
6 LearningFrom Chernobyl, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1986, at A30, col. 1. "The adoption

of the two Conventions indicates the will of the international community to provide
additional support for an international legal framework in the areas of notification and
emergency assistance." Szasz, Introductory Note, 25 I.L.M. 1369 (1986).
7 Soviets Ready to Discuss Liability Pactfor Nuclear Mishaps, L.A. Times, Oct. 6, 1986, at
12, col. I [hereinafter Soviets Ready].
8 Handl, Territorial Sovereignty and the Problem of TransnationalPollution, 69 AM. J.
INT'L L. 54 (1975).
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ted to conduct any activity not per se illegal within its territory;
second, sovereignty entails freedom from outside interferences
and externally caused harm.9 International law has increasingly
acknowledged that the equal sovereign rights of states are interdependent, and has subjected these rights to reciprocally operating limitations.'
The sic utere tuo principle has been defined by the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel case as "every State's
obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used contrary
to the rights of others."'" The Trail Smelter arbitration between
Canada and the United States1" is generally cited, along with the
Corfu Channel case, as the locus classicus13 of principles of liability
for transnational environmental pollution:
[N]o State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to
the territory of another or the properties or persons
therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the
4
injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.'
While arbitration offers a possible route for recovery in cases of
transborder pollution damage, "it appears that a country does
not have the power to compel another country to arbitrate a dispute unless a treaty or agreement concerning the matter in ques15
tion has previously been concluded between the countries."
9 Handl, An InternationalLegal Perspective on the Conduct of Abnormally DangerousActivities in Frontier Areas: The Case of Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1978).
Handl also discusses a second principle guiding the development of international law in
this area that focuses on the "importance of rational management of environmental resources irrespective of national boundaries." Id. at 5. But, as he notes, this international environmental law "has generally addressed instances of continuous transnational
pollution causing immediate actual damage," rather than the liability issues arising from
single-incident pollution following a nuclear accident. Id. at 5.
10 Handl, supra note 8, at 55.
1 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Judgment of Apr. 9); see also
Handl, supra note 8, at 55. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas means "use your own property so as not to injure your neighbor's."
12 Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. INr'L ARB. AWARDS 1905 (1941),
reprinted in 35 AM.J. INT'L L. 684 (1941); see also Nanda, The Establishment of International
Standardsfor TransnationalEnvironmental Injury, 60 IowA L. REV. 1095 (1975); Billingsley,
Private Party Protection Against TransnationalRadiation Pollution Through Compulsory Arbitration: A Proposal, 14 CASE W. REs.J. INT'L L. 339, 342 n.12 (1982); Handl, supra note 8, at
60.
13 Handl, supra note 8, at 60 .
14 Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R. ITr'L ARB. AWARDS at 1965.

15 Billingsley, supra note 12, at 347. For example, the Trail Smelter arbitration "apparently was possible only because an earlier boundary pact between the United States
and Canada contained provisions dealing with the subject matter of the dispute." Id. See
also Handl, supra note 8, at 62-63.
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The most definitive statement approving the sic utere tuo principle in the international environmental sphere appears in Principle 21 of the Declaration on the Human Environment'" adopted
at the 1972 United Nations Conference in Stockholm:
States [have], in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their
own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control [do]
not cause damage to the environment of other States
or of
7
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.'
While the United Nations General Assembly endorsed the
Conference Declaration a year later,' the Declaration itself is not
binding upon states.' 9 Nevertheless, it was generally the view of
the states at the Conference that Principle 21 affirmed existing
international legal obligations.2 °
The sic utere tuo principle, though well established in customary international law, affords little practical protection to individuals or states seeking recovery for transnational radiological
damage. For example, Australia and New Zealand brought suit
before the International Court of Justice in 1973 to halt French
atmospheric nuclear testing in the South Pacific, basing their
claim in part on a violation of territorial sovereignty caused by
fallout from the tests. 2 ' While the Court eventually declined to
decide the case on the merits after France publicly declared a halt
to further atmospheric tests,22 commentators questioned
whether Australia and New Zealand could base such a claim on
territorial sovereignty grounds. 23 In a dissenting opinion to the
Court's interim protective order, Judge Ignacio-Pinto wrote: "I
see no existing legal means in the present state of the law which
would authorize a State to come before the Court asking it to
prohibit another State from carrying out on its own territory such
16 See Declaration on

the Human Enviroment, 1972 U.N.Y.B. 317.

17 Id.at 320-21.
18 G.A. Res. 2995, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 42, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1973).
19 See Chernobyl Mishap: Payments Unlikely in Wake of Fallout, L.A. DailyJ., May 9, 1986,
at 20, col. 1 [hereinafter Mishap]; Billingsley, supra note 12, at 342 n.12.
20 Bramsen, Transnational Pollution and International Law, in PROBLEMS IN TRANS-

257, 278 n.20 (1974).
21 Nuclear Tests (Austi. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 99 (Interim Protection Order of June
22); Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 135 (Interim Protection Order of June 22).
FRONTIER POLLUTION

22 See U.N. MONTHLY CHRON.,Jan. 1975, at 99; see also Nanda, supra note 12, at 1099;
Billingsley, supra note 12, at 346-47. See generally B. JOHNSON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

(1976).

23 See Handl, supra note 8, at 50-53, 60.
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activities, which involve risks to its neighbors. 2 4
Diplomatic negotiations have sometimes yielded compensation for nuclear-related damages, but have not created legal
precedents or obligations. For example, the United States paid
$2 million to Japan in 1954 to compensate Japanese fisherman
for harm resulting from U.S. nuclear tests in the Marshall Islands. 25 The diplomatic note setting forth details of the agreement stated, however, that the payment was made "without
reference to the question of legal liability." '26 "The United States
has not accepted the argument that it must assume responsibility
under international law for damages caused accidentally and
without malicious intent by nuclear experiments conducted with
what were considered adequate safeguards. 27 More recently, in
1981, the Soviet Union concluded a settlement with Canada on a
clean-up bill for retrieving radioactive debris from a Soviet nuclear-powered satellite that broke up over northern Canada in
1978.28 However, in that case, the Canadians bolstered their diplomatic claim by referring to the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects-a
convention signed by both Canada and the Soviet Union.29
Only a limited number of international liability agreements
have dealt with transnational pollution problems in the nuclear
sphere. 30 The 1960 OECD-sponsored Paris Convention on
Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy and the 1960
Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention create individually enforceable rights for persons within Europe injured by
nuclear mishaps originating in European land-based nuclear
power plants. 31 The 1963 IAEA-sponsored Vienna Convention
1973 I.CJ. at 131 (Ignacio-Pinto, J., dissenting).
Agreement on Personal and Property Damage Claims, Jan. 4, 1955, United
States-Japan, 6 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 3160. See generally Comment, Bravo's Fallout: InternationalLaw and Nuclear Pollution in the Pacific, 14 N.C. CENr. L. J. 172 (1983).
26 Agreement on Personal and Property Damage Claims, supra note 25, at 1.
27 H-Bomb Payments to Toyho Detailed, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1955, at 6, col. 1.
28 Soviets Ready, supra note 7, at 12, col. 1.
29 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S No. 7762; see also Mishap, supra note 19, at 1, col.
6.
30 See Billingsley, supra note 12, at 351-54 (discussing anti-pollution conventions
and liability agreements). Anti-pollution conventions have generally constituted "more
a statement of intent than an explicit duty," id. at 350, unlike the liability conventions
discussed in the text. See infra text accompanying notes 31-37. While this discussion
focuses on multilateral treaties, a range of bilateral agreements on early notification and
emergency assistance following nuclear accidents also exists within Europe. See infra text
accompanying notes 48-50.
31 Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (Paris Con24
25
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on Civil Liability is almost identical to the Paris Convention, but
is global in scope. 2 When opened for signature, however, it was
signed only by China, Colombia, Lebanon, the Philippines, and
Yugoslavia. 3 The 1962 Brussels Convention on the Liability of
Operators of Nuclear Ships establishes that nuclear ship operators are absolutely liable for accidents involving their nuclear
ships.3 4 That Convention was signed by fourteen states, none of
which operates nuclear ships; the United States, Canada, the
United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France, and Germany are not
signatories.3 5 Finally, the Convention on the Protection of the
Environment Between Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden
establishes liability for transnational radiation pollution, and
gives individuals a right of action to prevent environmental damage. 6 This Convention guarantees equal access and nondiscrimination to citizens of a signatory State who bring suit in another
signatory State. 7 While this Nordic Convention has an extensive
scope of action, its geographic reach is obviously limited.
The Soviets acknowledge a "moral responsibility ' 38 for the
damage the Chernobyl accident caused in Europe. But they
maintain that they are not legally bound to compensate those
damaged. "[IT]he case that the Soviet Union is responsible for
this sort of thing under customary international law is a very
weak case. "40

The legal difficulties in holding the Soviets responsible...
include sovereign immunity bars to private lawsuits, the
vention),July 29, 1960, reprinted in 55 AM.J. INT'L L. 1082 (1961); Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention, Jan. 31, 1963, 2 I.L.M. 685 (1963); see also Jenks,
Liabilityfor Ultra-HazardousActivities in InternationalLaw, 117 RECUEIL DES COURS 98, 133
(1966) (Acad~mie de Droit International). See generally J. BARROS & D. JOHNSTON, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION (1974).
32 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, IAEA
Doc. CN-12/46, 2 I.L.M. 727 (1963).
33 Id. There are currently 13 parties and signatories. The United Kingdom is the
only major nuclear power to have signed. M. BOWMAN & D. HARRIS, MULTILATERAL
TREATIES: INDEX AND CURRENT STATUS 276 (1984).
34 Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, May 25, 1962, reprinted in 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 268 (1963); see also JENKS, supra note 31, at 138.
35 BOWMAN & HARRIS, supra note 33, at 268.
36 Convention on the Protection of the Environment, Denmark-Finland-NorwaySweden, Feb. 19, 1974, 13 I.L.M. 591 (1974), reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, NATIONAL
LEGISLATION AND TREATIES RELATING TO THE LAW OF ThE SEA 397, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/
SER.B/18 (1976); see also Billingsley, supra note 12, at 353.
37 Billingsley, supra note 12, at 353.
38 Safety Steps, supra note 4, at 36.
39 Id.

40 Mishap, supra note 19, at 20 (statement of Prof. P. Trimble of U.C.L.A. Law
School).
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Soviets' standing refusal to accept the jurisdiction of the
World Court, the lack of any treaty specifically governing
nuclear reactor mishaps, and the assumed reluctance of
Eastern European countries to press such a claim against
the Russians. In addition, [difficulties include] the meager
case law and the lack of full acceptance of what few specific
international law principles have been written recently to
impose responsibility for transborder pollution.4 '
Absent an already extant treaty prescribing a specific rule of international law, the evolving sic utere tuo principle,42in most situations, "merely creates a right without a remedy."
II.

BACKGROUND AND SUBSTANCE OF THE CONVENTIONS

Within this sparse context, the recent IAEA Conventions on
Early Notification and Assistance recognize a relatively noncontroversial common ground of legal responsibility for the transnational consequences of national nuclear activity. The
Conventions do not attempt to resolve the knottier issues of radiological safety standards or accident liability.
The concepts behind these Conventions are not new. IAEA
guidance on prompt notification and emergency assistance was
formulated as early as 1969 and has been periodically revised.43
Despite the "inherent tendency for guidance material to be relegated to the dusty shelves of libraries, offices, and storage
rooms," 44 the most recent IAEA Information Circulars in this

area45 proved useful as the negotiating drafts for the current
Conventions. 46 "In matters of substantial impact such as information exchange (including early notification) and mutual emergency assistance, .

.

. 'institutionalizing' the available guidance

through legal instruments [raises] the visibility of some types of
guidance and make[s] the most important ones binding among
41 Id.
42 Billingsley, supra note 12, at 349.
43 INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, PLANNING FOR THE HANDLING OF RADIATION ACCIDENTS (IAEA Safety Series No. 32, 1969); INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, PLANNING FOR
OFF-SITE RESPONSE TO RADIATION ACCIDENTS IN NUCLEAR FACILITIES (IAEA Safety Series

No. 55, 1981), noted in Collins, Emmerson & Phuong, Information Exchange and Mutual
Emergency Assistance, IAEA BULL., Autumn 1986, at 16.
44 Collins, Emmerson & Phuong, supra note 43, at 16.

45 Guidelines for Mutual Emergency Assistance Arrangements in Connection with a
Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, IAEA INFCIRC/310 (1984); Guidelines
on Reportable Events, Integrated Planning and Information Exchange in a Transboundary Release of Radioactive Materials, IAEA INFCIRC/321 (1985), noted inCollins,
Emmerson & Phuong, supra note 43, at 16.
46 Collins, Emmerson & Phuong, supra note 43, at 17.
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the parties to such instruments. 47
In addition to this history of guidance materials, international
agreements on notification and assistance have been developed.
The 1963 Nordic Mutual Emergency Assistance Agreement was
the earliest and only multilateral precedent to the present Conventions.48 In 1977, the IAEA concluded an agreement with the
United Nations Disaster Relief Office on cooperation in providing assistance following nuclear accidents. 49 More recently, the
IAEA has successfully encouraged a number of bilateral agreements on notification and assistance. However, these bilateral
agreements have been concluded only between European countries. 50 Thus, the current Conventions transform previously developed IAEA guidance materials into legal obligations and
universalize existing IAEA-sponsored bilateral agreements.
A.

Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident is
designed to "strengthen further international cooperation in the
safe development and use of nuclear energy" by providing "relevant information about nuclear accidents as early as possible in
order that transboundary radiological consequences can be minimized.'5 According to Hans Blix, Director General of the
IAEA: "Had [the Convention on Early Notification] existed in
[the Chernobyl] case, the information needed by neighbors
would probably have been forthcoming. They would have been
52
alerted earlier and could have taken some precautions.1
The Convention applies broadly to any accident in a signatory
state, except weapons-related leaks or underground tests, that results or may result in international transboundary release of radiological material of safety significance to another state.53 The
Convention outlines implementing and pre-accident procedures
Id.
48 Nordic Mutual Emergency Assistance Agreement, IAEA INFCIRC/49 (1963),
noted in Collins, Emmerson & Phuong, supra note 43, at 17.
49 Collins, Emmerson & Phuong, supra note 43, at 17.
50 During the 1977-1982 period, a number of bilateral agreements were entered
into by Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, West Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland. Id. See, e.g., Agreement on the
Exchange of Information About Accidents with Potential Radiological Consequences,
France-Switzerland, Oct. 18, 1979, noted in Collins, Emmerson & Phuong, supra note 43,
at 17.
51 Convention on Early Notification, Preamble, supra note 3.
52 Blix, The Post-ChernobylOutlookfor Nuclear Power, IAEA BULL., Autumn 1986, at 11.
53 Convention on Early Notification, supra note 3, art. 1.
47
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under which, for example, IAEA can assist in setting up a radiation monitoring system for countries that lack significant nuclear
experience, but have nonsignatory neighbors with active nuclear
programs. 54
A party experiencing a nuclear accident must immediately notify the IAEA and potentially affected states of the location, time,
and type of accident, and must provide any available information
to minimize radiological consequences to affected states.55 The
IAEA will then act as an information clearinghouse 56 by relaying
a detailed list of "notifying state" information that should
include:
a) the time, exact location where appropriate, and the
nature of the nuclear accident;
b) the facility or activity involved;
c)

the .

. cause and the foreseeable development . . .

.

relevant to the transboundary release... ;
d) the general characteristics of the radioactive release
e)

information on . . . meteorological and hydrological

conditions, necessary for forecasting the transboundary release... ;
f) the results of [relevant] environmental monitoring
g)
h)

the off-site protective measures taken or planned;
the predicted behavior over time of the radioactive
release.57
Disputes concerning the Convention's interpretation or application are handled initially through negotiation among the parties to the dispute.58 If not settled within a year, such disputes
may, at either party's request, be submitted to arbitration or to
the International Court ofJustice for resolution. 59 However, parties can, upon signing the Convention, declare themselves not
bound by the dispute resolution procedures.60 Twelve signatories, including four key nuclear powers (the Soviet Union, the
United States, France, and China), exercised this option, limiting
the Convention's force by eliminating automatic international ju54

Id. art. 8. This article applies, for example, to signatories bordering South

Africa.
55 Id. arts. 2, 5.
56

Id. arts. 4, 7.

57 Id. art. 5.
58
59
60

Id. art. 11, para. 1.
Id. art. 11, para. 2.
Id. art. 11, para. 3.
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risdiction over these parties.
However, the key nuclear powers also agreed to apply the
Early Notification Convention to accidents not covered by the
Convention, 62 referring primarily to leaks from weapons and underground tests. 63 These statements effectively include notification of accidents arising out of the five nations' nuclear military
activities, a significant expansion of the Convention's reach, albeit on a somewhat less stringent legal standard.64
With "the ink scarcely dry on the accord,"6 5 the Convention's
procedures were followed in the first nuclear accident after its
adoption: the USSR promptly notified the IAEA when one of its
nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarines exploded and
sank between October 4 and 6, 1986.66 The USSR indicated that
there was no danger of nuclear explosion or radioactive contamination of the environment. "Though it was not specified that this
notification was made in accordance with the Early Notification
Convention, it may be noted that such notification would be consistent with the undertakings by the USSR to apply the Convention provisionally and also to apply it to all nuclear activities. 6 7
61 Reservations and Declarations Communicated to the Depositary, IAEA Docs.
N5.55.2 circ. and N5.55.3 circ., Annex C, 25 I.L.M. 1395 (1986). The United Kingdom,
the remaining nuclear military power, did not exercise this option.
62 Statements of Voluntary Application of Early Notification Convention to Accidents Not Covered by the Convention, 25 I.L.M. 1394 (1986) (verbatim excerpts from
statements made at the IAEA Special Session adopting the Convention). The statements were made pursuant to article 3 of the Convention.
63 Safety Steps, supra note 4, at 36, col. 2.
64 See Declaration by India, 25 I.L.M. 1401 (1986). After expressing disappoint-

ment that nuclear military accidents were not included in the Conventions, the Indian
declaration concludes:
Nevertheless, we have decided to sign both conventions, subject to ratification,
in view of the solemn assurance that has been given by the five nuclear weapons
states to the effect that they undertake to notify all accidents. This is in keeping
with our policy of according to public declarations of state policy equal validity
with other international commitments.
Id.
65 Learning From Chernobyl, supra note 6, at A30, col. 1.
66 See id.; Moscow's New Policy Reflected in Sub Report, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1986, at 14,
col. 5; Lemonick, A Scary Accident at Sea, TIME, Oct. 20, 1986, at 73; Death on a Soviet Sub,
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 13, 1986, at 51: "The [United States] State Department commended
the Kremlin for its 'quick notification' of the incident and offered U.S. assistance, which
the Soviets so far have not accepted."
67 Szasz, supra note 6, at 1370 (emphasis in original); see also Highlights,supra note 3,
at 44. Many parties, including the Soviet Union, agreed to apply the Convention provisionally, pursuant to art. 13, until ratified by the signatory's government and until the
Convention formally entered into force. Szasz, supra note 5, at 1391 (listing signatories
agreeing to apply the Convention provisionally). The submarine incident occured during this provisional period. See Soviet Ratifies Nucear Accident Conventions, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 16, 1986, at 19, col. 1.
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B.

Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or
RadiologicalEmergency

The Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency closely parallels the Convention
on Early Notification. Both conventions set up identical implementation and technical structures. 6n The Convention on Assistance provides that parties will "facilitate prompt assistance in the
event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency to minimize its consequences and to protect life, property and the environment from the effects of radioactive releases."169 According to
Hans Blix of the IAEA, "[w]hile the Soviet Union and other
States with large nuclear programmes may be less in need of such
assistance, many countries with smaller nuclear programmes
might be more dependent upon it." 7
The Convention is meant to simplify and speed procedures
for bringing in emergency aid by, for example, granting immunity from taxation, arrest, and other legal problems to the people
providing assistance. 7 ' If a state needs assistance after a nuclear
accident, it may call for assistance from any other party or from
international intergovernmental agencies. 7 2 The parties then respond by notifying the requesting state regarding the aid they are
willing to make available and financial terms for that aid. 7 ' The
Convention outlines procedures for establishing points of contact between parties,'7 chains of command for assisting personnel, 7 5 and policies on reimbursement of CoStS. 76 In addition, the
Convention provides that the IAEA will function as an assistance
clearinghouse 77 and coordinator, preparing emergency plans, radiation monitoring programs, and personnel training courses. 78
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
69 Convention on Assistance, supra note 3, art. 1, para. 1.
70 Blix, supra note 52, at 11; see also Collins, Emmerson & Phuong, supra note 43, at
16: "Even highly developed countries... could find themselves hard-pressed to cope
effectively with such an accident, especially if it involved serious off-site radiological
consequences."
71 Convention on Assistance, supra note 3, arts. 8, 10; see also Soviets Ready, supra
note 7, at 12, col. 1.
72 Convention on Assistance, supra note 3, art. 2, para. 1.
73 Id. art. 2, paras. 3, 4.
74 Id. art. 4.
75 Id. art. 3.
76 Id. art. 7. Assisting countries are encouraged to give "due consideration to the
needs of developing countries," when determining whether to waive or postpone reimbursement for assistance provided. Id. art. 7, para. 3.
77 Id. art. 2, para. 6, art. 4, para. 3.
78 Id. art. 5.
68
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As with the Convention on Early Notification, the Convention
on Assistance provides a clause by which signatories can exempt
themselves from the dispute resolution procedures. 79 The same
twelve parties that exercised this option under the Convention
on Early Notification also exercised it under the Convention on
Assistance.80
III.

CONCLUSION

By their global reach and rapid acceptance, the Conventions
on Early Notification and Assistance represent an advance over
previous multilateral treaties dealing with the extraterritorial
consequences of nuclear accidents. The scope of the Convention
on Early Notification has been further expanded by the commitment of the five nuclear military powers to a measure of international accountability concerning nuclear military accidents. The
conventions create a legal right in affected countries to rapid information from the country in which a nuclear accident occurs
and assistance from that country or from other nations or international organizations. The conventions have reinforced this
right by establishing a dispute resolution procedure and authorizing centralized and systematized information gathering and dissemination by the IAEA.
The conventions should not give rise to cynicism despite their
admittedly narrow scope and the exceptions to their dispute resolution procedures. They represent the core of agreement
emerging from the political fallout of the Chernobyl accident.
Both were opened for signature "in what diplomats agreed was
probably record time-four months from the start of technical
negotiations."'" Viewed as part of an ongoing negotiating process, these conventions may signal a broader willingness to overcome significant obstacles to multilateral agreement on nuclear
accident liability, such as varying radiation protection standards
among the IAEA's 113 member countries.8 2 In the final session,
79 Id. art. 13, para. 3.
80 See Reservations and Declarations Communicated to the Depository, supra note

61.
81 Soviets Ready, supra note 7. "The international community has acted with excep-

tional speed ....

These Conventions fill key gaps that existed in the international struc-

ture; they reflect an international concensus." President's Message to the Senate
Transmitting the Conventions, 23 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 291 (Mar. 23, 1987).
82 Soviets Ready, supra note 7, at 12. "It may be impossible to cover the whole world

with a single agreement. Circumstances vary so much from one region to another, from
Asia, to Europe to Latin America, that we may have to solve this on a regional basis, with

Recent Developments

at which the conventions were adopted, the General conference
passed a measure noting the range of proposals in the air and
commented that they were "[c]onvinced that the subject-matter
of international cooperation in the field of nuclear safety has not
yet been exhausted and that further consideration should be
given to the [listed] statements and proposals." 3
There is now a substantial international constituency backing
negotiations for a liability convention. The Soviet Union has indicated that it is willing to discuss the liability question in principle. It insists, however, that discussions relate to future
accidents, and consider "material, moral, and political damage
caused by unwarranted action taken under the pretext of protection against the consequences of nuclear accidents, ' 8 4 an apparent reference to Western reaction to Chernobyl. 5 At the IAEA
Conference adopting the conventions, Peter Walker, Britain's energy minister, said, "the British Government is anxious to see a
general system of compensation in respect of nuclear accidents,
and we would support a binding international regime to provide
that compensation." 86 West Germany, Austria, and Luxembourg
voiced similar support.8 7 As Walter Wallmann, West German
minister for the environment and nuclear safety, wrote:
Chernobyl's most important-ethical-lesson is that nations cannot ignore the consequences of nuclear problems
beyond their borders and that national interest must yield
to a broader concern for the safety and well-being of everyone on this planet.... [T]he principle that the "polluter
pays" must be applied when compensation for damages is
sought. Financial responsibility for trans-border damages
must be borne by the country that causes an accident.
Chernobyl has made possible the beginnings of international cooperation in providing nuclear safety.88
As the incident at Chernobyl demonstrates, accidents will
regional agreements." Id. (statement of a ranking Western diplomat at the IAEA
session).
83 Measures to Strengthen International Cooperation in Nuclear Safety and Radiological Protection, Draft Resolution adopted unchanged by the Special Session of the
General Conference, Sept. 26, 1986, IAEA Doc. GC(SPL.I)/15/Rev.1, 25 I.L.M. 1389
(1986).
84 Soviets Ready, supra note 7.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Wallmann, Toward Nuclear-Energy Safety, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1986, at 35, col. 2
(editorial by West German Minister of Environment, Protection of Nature, and Nuclear
Reactor Safety).
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happen.8 9 When they do, the Conventions on Early Notification
and Assistance will provide an established and legally recognized
mechanism for ameliorating the damage they cause. Concretely,
the conventions define international expectations for minimally
acceptable behavior following nuclear accidents; more abstractly,
they expand legal recognition of global environmental interdependence and national responsibility for the transnational consequences of nuclear activities.
Michael A. Heller

89 "[I]n the period from 1971 to 1985 there were 151 accidents [at nuclear power
plants] of varying degrees of seriousness in 14 countries of the world." Petrosyants, The
Soviet Union and the Development of Nuclear Power, IAEA BULL., Autumn 1986, at 5, 7 (the
author is Chairman of the Soviet State Committee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy).
See generally Costello, Armed Forces (Columbia Records 1978).

